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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effect an
industrial funded chargeback system would have on management
and control o-f Marine Corps non—depl oyabl e ADP resources. A
general methodology will be proposed -for achieving
industrial funded ADP, if necessary.
B. BACKGROUND
There are many differing opinions on the degree of
centralization required for effective ADP resource
management. Some favor centralized management. Others
favor decentralized management or some compromise between
the two. King CRef. 13 has pointed out that cost is not the
primary issue. Arguments about lowered cost and increased
effectiveness can be made on both sides of the issue. The
real question is one of control. King CRef. 23 describes
the situation as follows:
"The prevailing norms of the organization can provide
guidance for dealing with control over computing. If the
organization is highly centralized in most of its
operations, a highly centralized control arrangement for
computing is possible and probably sensible. Similarly,
if the organization follows highly decentralized control
policies, such as establishment of operating units as
profit centers, decentralization of control might be
necessary and desirable. Most organizations have a range
of control arrangements, depending on what is being
controlled. Decisions about control over computing should
parallel those organizational arrangements governing the
13
areas in which it is applied. Thus, if computing is
applied mainly to centralized -financial activities,
centralized control o-f computing should be appropriate.
On the other hand, if computing tends to be a
general -purpose resource used for many different kinds of
applications at the department level, and departmental
managers have considerable autonomy in how they run their
operations, some decentralization of control to these
managers might be appropriate. The goal is to ensure that
the arrangements for controlling computing are not widely
out of keeping with other organizational practices.
Computing should not be thought of as a tool by which the
basic structures and behaviors of organizations can be
changed.
"
Computing should be a tool to be used within the structure
of the organization without any attempt to seriously modify
the way in which an organization conducts its business.
Similarly, there have been numerous arguments on the
value of industrial funding in general and ADP chargeback in
particular. Arguments for chargeback center around
elimination of the "free good" syndrome where "users are
motivated and even encouraged to make use of ADP services
for practically any amount of marginal benefit no matter how
small." CRef. 33 This position is supported by OMB Circular
A— 121 which requires "accounting for the full cost of
operating data processing facilities" and "allocating all
costs to users according to the service they receive." CRef.
43 Arguments against chargebacks center around the high
overhead costs often needed to administer the chargeback
system. As stated by Hamrick and Ragland CRef. 53,
'Fee—for—service 7 is not cheap, especially since it
produces no direct benefits... Besides the initial
development and implementation costs involved, there are
costs associated with the collecting, storing, and
14
processing o-f the raw data, preparing and veri-fying the
bills, reviewing and certifying charges, and accounting
for and transferring -funds."
Even where chargeback is accepted as the way to do business,
the actual chargeback method to be used is often questioned.
Industrial funds have been criticized as inefficient because
these funds can easily pass along their inefficiencies to a
captive clientele CRef. 63. Similarly, rate stabilization
places restrictions on industrial funded activities which
may discourage effective management CRef. 73. Reimbursement
to mission funded units is a problem where one system, and
perhaps even one transaction within a system, crosses many
different budget boundaries. There is no accurate way to
fairly allocate charges. A third alternative, statistical
chargeback, calculates system cost estimates for user
awareness but often lacks accuracy. Because there is no
bill to pay, there is no real incentive to manage costs;
yet, there is still a significant overhead involved in
gathering and managing the cost data.
Finally, the issue of what degree of commercial
contracting for ADP services is appropriate creates another
forum for policy dispute. ADP is defined as a Commercial
Activity under OMB Circular A-76 CRef. 83. As such,
commercial contracting is encouraged where favorable cost
differentials can be established. Given the current
capacity and manpower constraints with the DoD, commercial
contracting provides an opportunity to contract for
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'backlogged' requirements which cannot be produced
'in—house.' Commercial contracting is limited, however, by
the requirement to keep "inherently governmental" CRef. 9D
systems in-house and to provide, in the interest o-f
"national defense" CRef. 10D, shore rotation billets for ADP
personnel. There is also political opposition to commercial
contracting in Congress CRe-f. 1
1
1 and by civil service
personnel. Finally, there is a history o-f less than
successful commercial contracting efforts, although it
cannot be stated unequivocally that these failures were the
fault of the contractors involved.
C. SCOPE
This thesis will view Marine Corps ADP management and
control in light of these issues, with specific focus on how
industrial funded ADP management could best be implemented.
Accordingly, other methods of ADP management and
organization are covered to the degree necessary to provide
background for discussion of the applicability of industrial
funding, but not to the degree necessary to conclude that
any particular method is the r best*. Rather, it is the
objective of this thesis to examine the concept of
industrial funding for Marine Corps non—depl oyable ADP
assets, with an emphasis on the advantages its offers, and
the problems which can be foreseen.
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D. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS ORGANIZATION
Research included review o-f regulations, case histories,
operating manuals, budget and planning documents, published
texts, magazine articles, and previous research. Topics
emphasized were industrial -funding, ADP management and
control, -financial management, ADP chargeback, Federal and
DoD regulations, and ADP economic issues. Interviews were
conducted with ADP and financial management personnel
located at the Naval Data Automation Command, Defense
Communications Agency, and Headquarters, Marine Corps in
Washington D.C., and Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow
CA.
Chapter I presents the purpose o-f the thesis, basic
themes it will emphasize, and research methodology. Chapter
II presents an overview o-f the current Marine Corps
management structure and mission with an emphasis on
non-deployable assets. Chapter III provides a brie-f history
o-f Marine Corps ADP, a definition of currently identified
trends and deficiencies, and steps being taken to correct
those deficiencies. Chapter IV brings in a discussion of
the intertwined effect on Marine Corps ADP management of
Life Cycle Management, procurement, budget, Commercial
Activity, and ADP cost accounting regulations. Chapter V
presents a discussion of economic theory and market effect
upon ADP operations. Chapter VI specifically discusses
chargeback, its advantages, its disadvantages, and the pros
17
and cons o-f possible methods o-f implementation by the Marine
Corps. Chapter VII describes how the Naval Data Automation
Command implemented industrial funding and discusses its
future plans and concerns. Chapter VIII presents proposed
guidelines for adoption of industrial funded ADP by the
Marine Corps. Chapter IX reviews advantages of the proposed
system in relation to the issues originally raised in this
chapter. Finally, Chapter X imposes cautions and concerns,
particularly emphasizing the firm commitment to change which
must be in place before the evolution toward industrial
funding can begin.
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II. MARINE CORPS ADP ORGANIZATION
A. HEADQUARTERS
Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems
(C4> Division i s an independent headquarters division
organization reporting directly to the Chief o-f Staff, U.S.
Marine Corps. (See Figure 2-1). Headed by a Brigadier
General (and sometimes -filled by a senior colonel), C4 must
deal with the politically more power-ful departments (headed
by Lieutenant Generals) and other divisions which are headed
by Major Generals or a civilian of equivalent status.
Separate division status, however, does give a direct line
to the Chief of Staff when necessary.
Management of non-tactical computers within C4 is
provided by the Information Systems Support and Management
Branch (CCI). Duties include:
"(1) Providing technical direction to Marine Corps ADP
activities through the development and promulgation
of ADP policies, procedures and standards.
(2) Formulating Marine Corps policies, procedures and
standards for the development, implementation and
management of AIS's.
(3) Assessing current and projected ADP support
requirements.
(4) Programming and budgeting for the acquisition and
maintenance of ADPE, software, facilities and
personnel
.
(5) Exercising technical direction of and advising on
the requirements for technical training and
assignment of military and civilian ADP personnel.
(6) Providing technical support for major ADP
procurements and allocating hardware, software, and
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Figure 2—1 Headquarters Sta-f-f Organizations (Abridged)
(7) Developing plans, policies and procedures regarding
ADP security." [Ref. 123
CCI is composed of the -following four sections:
1. The Resources Management Section (CCIR) controls
budget preparation, equipment procurement, and
personnel management.
2. The Systems Engineering Section (CCIE) controls
con-figuration management, equipment and systems
software planning, and statistical analysis.
3. The Administrative Programs Section (CCIP) controls
-forms and reports management and o-f -f ice automation
planning.
4. The Systems Analysis and Review Section (CCIS)
coordinates development o-f all new ADP systems and
establishes policy regarding such systems. This
section is responsible -for preparation o-f ADP plans
and -for monitoring compliance with the Li-fe Cycle
Management (LCM) directives CRe-f. 133 and proper
software development procedures.
B. FIELD ORGANIZATIONS
1 . Marine Corps Central Design and Programming
Activities (MCCDPA' s)
There are three Marine Corps Central Design and
Programming Activities. MCCDPA Kansas City, Missouri is
responsible for personnel records and disbursing. MCCDPA
Albany, Georgia is responsible for supply and maintenance
systems. MCCDPA Quantico, Virginia, with its subsidiary
site at Headquarters, handles most other requirements.
Other field units do some programming, but that capability
is limited by internal regulation, and by the fact that
field units are not given program development manpower, nor
sufficient funding to contract for ADP programming services.
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2. Other sites
In addition to the three MCCDPA' s which also function
as major operational processing centers, there are six
Regional Automated Services Centers (RASC's) with the
primary mission to "provide day—to—day production support
-for all assigned AIS's. " CRef. 141 "The regional centers
operate as a service center in that multiple functional
areas are supported and the computer is a shared resource."
CRef. 151 Four of the RASC's (located at Camp Pendleton,
CA; Camp Lejeune, NC* Camp Hansen, Okinawa; and Camp Smith,
HI) have similar, although somewhat smaller, capacities and
the same operating systems (IBM compatible) and major
systems software as the MCCDPA' s. All major applications
programming is designed to run at any or all of the seven
major sites (three MCCDPA' s and four of the RASC's). The
remaining two RASC's (located at Marine Corps Air Stations,
El Toro, CA and Cherry Point, NO support only Naval
Aviation unique applications and are not considered part of
the 'seven major sites' although they are connected to them
via remote job entry (RJE) facilities. In addition, there
are twenty—five other RJE sites and approximately 2,000
terminals located throughout the Marine Corps. All are
connected to the ^backbone' of seven major sites.
3. Marine Corps Data Network (MCDN)
Virtually all sites are connected by data
communications facilities known collectively as the Marine
Corps Data Network (MCDN) . (See Figure 2-2). CRef. 163. It
is possible, -for instance, to query a personnel record in
Kansas City -from an ADP terminal in Camp Hansen, Okinawa
using satellite links to the mainland, leased land lines
within the Continental United States, and switches in the
•form o-f communications processors at intervening RASC's.
Since most o-f these sites are separately -funded, a single
transaction can encompass operating costs and capacity
utilization -for several di-f-ferent operating budget holders,
many o-f whom have no direct interest in the transaction.
C. LINES OF AUTHORITY
Although "Marine Corps policy is to centralize technical
direction, policy -formulation, and resource management at
HQMC under the Director, C4 Division, while providing ADP
support on a regional basis" CRef. 173, the actual lines o-f
authority can be described -from -four separate points o-f
view:
1 - Military Chain of Command1 ,
The base or station commander is considered
responsible for the operation and maintenance of facilities
which are part of his organization. This commander has
administrative control and is responsible for personnel
matters, facilities, and 0?<M funding. This commander also
has operational control as commander of the unit to which



















Figure 2-2 Marine Corps Data Network
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2- Headquarters (C4 Division)
Although having no line responsibility, C4 Division
maintains strong control over computing assets. The
Director has operational control over MCCDPA functions. All
new Headquarters, Marine Corps sponsored (Class I) systems
require C4 (CCIS) approval. All equipment procurements are
handled by C4 (CCIR) or must be delegated to local
contracting o-f-ficers. Senior military data processing
personnel assignments are recommended by C4 (CCIR).
Although personnel assignment is a Manpower responsibility,
these recommendations by C4 are generally approved by
Manpower.
3. The Functional Manager
Each functional area in the Headquarters is a
'functional manager 7 for one or more systems (e.g.. Fiscal
Division is responsible for the various accounting systems).
Functional managers are "responsible for defining their
requirements, including determining current needs,
forecasting future needs, validating those needs, and
providing funds to support ADP program initiatives." CRef.
183 A section of personnel within the functional sponsor's
organization may be assigned to monitor a system, recommend
changes, and document new requirements within its functional
area. These requirements are forwarded to C4 Division
(CCIS) for approval and then to the appropriate MCCDPA for
design and implementation. Design and implementation are
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monitored by a formally chartered AIS Steering Group
composed primarily o-f users with an interest in the project
along with some representation from C4 Division- This
Steering Group also has the power to "redirect or terminate
the project if the project is not progressing
satisfactorily." ERef. 193
4. The MCDN Hierarchy
MCCDPA, Kansas City forms the 'Master Node' of the
MCDN hierarchy. Changes which involve data communications
must begin at MCCDPA, Kansas City. Because MCDN is designed
to be a hierarchical system with standard communications
protocols, other nodes in the system must adapt their
methods to match changes adopted by nodes at a higher level.
Since most Headquarters Class I systems operate at several
nodes in the network, changes made at one node to either the
operating system or communications system interfaces must be
replicated throughout the network.
D. SUMMARY
As in most military staff support functions, control of
ADP is performed through a matrix of shared authority
between line command and staff direction. In addition,
control of ADP is shared with users as a third entity due to
the fact that responsibility for design, implementation, and
funding of new systems has been imposed on separate
functional managers and user controlled AIS Steering Groups.
Finally, the physical structure of the Marine Corps ADP
systems themselves form a -fourth entity o-f control. To
provide effective ADP support, the goals and incentives
created by all -Four entities must not conflict.
III. HISTORY. PLANS. AND CONCERNS
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
"The absence of a control system... to encourage
appropriate appraisal of the new use in terms of cost and
benefits to the organization. . -may result in explosive
growth (often unprofitable and poorly managed) with new
capacity required every one or two years or,
alternatively, little growth with frustrated users
obtaining services surreptitiously (and more
expensively)." CRef. 20J
Controls on ADP abound, both within the Marine Corps and
as imposed from outside. 1 The 'appropriateness* of these
controls is questionable, since Marine Corps information
systems management has exhibited both explosive growth and
frustrated users.
Until about 1980, the no—growth symptom was prevalent.
The 1970* s were an era of limited resources. All efforts
went toward most effective use of outdated equipment and
limited capacity. Systems development policy became more
and more restrictive and authority more and more
centralized. Programming assets were centralized at the
three Marine Corps Central Design and Programming Activities
(MCCDPA's). Field activities and local bases and stations
1 The perspective presented in this section is based
primarily on Major (then Captain) G.A. Ham's experience as
the Budget Officer, Resources Management Section,
Information Systems Support and Management Branch, C4
Systems Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, April
1980 to July 1983.
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were left with little, if any, organic programming
capabi 1 i ty.
This approach was reasonable -for the 1970' s, but
information needs continued to grow in spite of efforts to
discourage that growth. Yet, there was no capacity to
handle growth. There were minor upgrades here and there,
but the IBM 360 CPU's first obtained in 1965 were still the
only major processors as late as 1981. Because there was no
capacity to accommodate new systems, analysis and
programming functions tended to atrophy. New personnel
could not be justified without new systems requirements, and
new systems could not be brought on board due to capacity
limitations. Without new systems or new challenges, current
employee skills tended to atrophy as well. New skills were
not needed on old equipment. Many people who needed to grow
in their jobs, both civilian and military, left the Marine
Corps for more challenging positions elsewhere. Many who
remained could be described as an 'old guard' who were
highly resistant to change.
Users still had requirements that had to be met. Those
users whose data processing needs tended to be fulfilled had
either the requisite political horsepower or had
requirements that could be satisfied with minimal in—house
resources. Where funding was available, outside contractors
were sometimes used. However, funding tended to be short in
the 1970' s, and outside contracting was mostly limited to
those users with the necessary power to press their own
needs. Manpower Department at Headquarters, Marine Corps
contracted—out several o-f their modelling systems and, in
the late 1970 ? s, began contracting -for a commercially
time—shared Recruit Management System- Requirements and
Programs Division at HQMC used contractor support -for
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development which also
included computer processing. However, most other user
requirements were stuck in the eternal wait mode. It was
hard to justify money -for computers when there were
significant table of equipment deficiencies within FMF
units.
About 1980, events began to force a change in this
restrictive method of computer management. First, old
equipment and systems began to break down. In many cases,
it became more expensive to operate the old equipment than
to buy new equipment. Unreliable supply and manpower
management systems brought more and more complaints from the
field and 'readiness' worries from Marine Corps planners.
The Marine Corps 'deployable' Force Automated Services
Centers (FASC's), which were supposed to move with a Marine
Amphibious Brigade (MAB) rear echelon to provide processing
of battlefield supply and logistics requirements, would go
down if someone only bumped the trailer hard from outside.
Deployabi 1 i ty was questionable at best.
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Secondly, users were becoming less tolerant o-f outdated,
ineffective service. They had been exposed to other
organization's systems (airline reservations, banks, etc.)
and knew that Marine Corps computing was a very poor example
o-f what could be done. They began designing new systems o-f
their own, first within the ADP management structure, and,
when they could not get support, outside the MCCDPA's in
their own development groups, sometimes aided by civilian
contractors.
Finally, as a result of the increase in perceived need
by the users (who often also made budget decisions), and a
generally less restrictive military financial climate, the
money to move became available. Beginning about FY 1980,
O&MMC funding for new systems development became
progressively easier to obtain. New planning for on-line
large scale database oriented systems was funded for
supply, accounting, and manpower management. By 1984, there
were more than forty new systems approved for development;
in contrast, only two new systems were in development in
1977 CRef. 213. Approved equipment procurement funding for
1982 had increased ten—fold over 1975 levels.
But while funding increased, manpower to administer the
system did not (Figure 3—1) CRef. 223. Few revisions were
initially made to the highly centralized and restrictive
management policies. These conditions resulted in excessive
backlogs. Procurements were late. New system software
USMC ADP PERSONNEL RESOURCES
Figure 3-1 USMC ADP Personnel Resources
development milestones slipped with resulting time delays
and cost increases. Because o-f both the hardware and
so-ftware delays, -funding -For system development and
equipment procurement was 'at risk* during budget reviews as
the funding o-f ten could not be obligated within the required
time -frames.
When some users could not get results in—house -from
MCCDPA's or C4, they would try to develop their own system
-from within their own o-f -f ice, sometimes with the help o-f an
outside contractor. Initially -frowned upon by C4 data
processing managers, this method later gained acceptance as
the only way in which the huge volume o-f work required could
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be accomplished. Results were sometimes good, but
contractor products were often bad because contracts were
let with poor Statements of Work (S0W 7 s> or were not
supervised adequately. Lack o-f adequate supervision
sometimes led to improper contractor relationships and/or
illegal contracts with resulting protests and regulatory
problems.
Cost estimates for new systems were particularly poor.
The Standard Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System
(SABRS) economic analysis estimated a total O&MMC
development cost of %1 million CRef. 233; the Marine Corps
Standard Supply System (M3S) was also estimated at %1
million for implementation costs CRef. 243. Current O&MMC
projections are in excess of $15 million and $49 million
respectively CRef. 253.
But, these two systems are both vital. With respect to
the supply system,
"The status quo is totally unacceptable. To maintain all
systems in their present state is not realistic. The
Marine Corps can not support the resource requirement to
maintain all existing systems in their present state while
accommodating Standard MILS changes in multiple systems.
The cost of continuing such an effort is prohibitive in
terms of efficiency and resources." CRef. 263
Some form of new supply system is necessary, in spite of
escalated cost projections. Similarly, the multiplicity of
current accounting systems are often unresponsive to
management needs and do not meet General Accounting Office
accounting system certification standards CRef. 273. A new
o>o
-financial system which "will provide the Marine Corps with a
standard -financial system that will integrate the
accounting, budgeting, and -financial reporting systems into
a single system" CRe-f. 283 is clearly needed. There are
many, many other new system requirements which have been
documented CRe-f. 293. Despite inaccuracies in projected
costs, the need -for new systems is clearly evident.
Figures 3—2 to 3—4 show the stability o-f the 1970* s in
contrast with rapid increases in capacity since 1980 CRe-f s.
30,313. For these -figures, quantities shown through 1984
are based on actual equipment in place; outyear -figures are
based on the additional increases in equipment required by
new systems currently approved and under development. As
CPU CAPACITY GROWTH
AT SEVEN MAJOR SITES
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Figure 3-2 CPU Capacity Growth
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Figure 3-3 Direct Access Storage
INTERACTIVE TERMINAL GROWTH
AT SEVEN MAJOR SITES
Figure 3-4 Interactive Terminal Growth
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the -figures indicate, the Marine Corps has jumped head -first
from a policy of excessive restraint to a situation where so
many different systems are under development that
foreseeable procurements, no matter how well executed,
cannot achieve the necessary capacity.
B. IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES
The basic problems with Marine Corps ADP management have
been recognized by Marine Corps ADP planners and were
summarized as follows in a 26 July 1984 brief for the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps:
"The primary weaknesses in the current management
approach are in the areas of planning, visibility and
priorities- The current automation planning process is an
uncoordinated, bottom—up approach which is not guided by
high level, long term Marine Corps goals. The visibility
into the total scope, impact and cost of all developing
information systems is obscured because of deficiencies or
inconsistencies in the life cycle management and budgeting
processes. The total cost of automated information
systems is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
because of the many pots of money and the disregarded cost
of existing general support ADP assets.
"The priorities of the developing automated
information systems relative to each other do not exist.
Available ADP assets are allocated on a first come first
served basis with exceptions made on the basis of sponsor
influence or the loudest cry for support.
"In a time when ADP assets are limited and will not
support all requirements, these weaknesses must be
strengthened to avoid wasting or misusing our resources
and the benefits that automation can provide." CRef. 32D
C. CENTRALIZED PLANNING UNDER THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS STEERING
COMMITTEE
The Marine Corps is taking specific steps to alleviate
some of these difficulties. A formally chartered
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In-formation Systems Steering Committee (ISSC) has been
created consisting of a general o-f-Ficer representative -from
each major headquarters staff agency and chaired by the
Director, C4 Systems Division. The responsibilities of the
ISSC are:
"(1) Validating on-line administration AIS 7 s by linking
overall Marine Corps strategy with computer
strategy.
(2) Setting strategic direction for management
information policy and building a commitment to this
pol icy.
(3> Establishing priorities for ADP support and mission
essential processing requirements.
(4) Approving the Information Systems Support Plan.
(5) Approving the Long Range Information Systems Plan.
(6) Presenting specific recommended actions and/or
alternative course of action regarding information
systems issues to the ACMC Committee." CRef. 33D
The primary purpose for the ISSC is to provide as much
visibility as possible to the total scope of ADP in the
Marine Corps to provide better prioritization and planning
in the use and procurement of ADP assets. Its primary
benefit is as a forum for open consideration of both
political and economic issues. As such, it tends to make
the bureaucracy more honest and discourages 'back door'
systems. The ISSC also adds another layer of bureaucracy to
the Life Cycle Management (LCM) process.
While the ISSC is a significant attempt to improve the
ADP resource allocation process, it does not guarantee
effective or efficient decision making. If economic issues
are to have any clout in the forum provided by the ISSC,
there must be an improvement in the visibility of the cost
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o-f the systems themselves. Similarly, the backlog o-f
requirements brought be-fore the ISSC will never be reduced
to a manageable level as long as users view ADP as a
'no—cost 7 option.
D. THE CHARGEBACK ALTERNATIVE
One possibility -for addressing ADP capacity short-falls
suggested by Marine Corps ADP planners has been to
"implement a cost reporting and chargeback system that
includes time—o-f—day processing. .. -functional managers
would be made aware o-f and would have to -fund -for the ADP
support they receive." CRe-f. 343 This alternative has not
been officially endorsed, but ADP planners have committed
themselves to:
"Conduct a feasibility study by -fourth quarter FY 85 to
determine whether the implementation o-f an ADP cost
recovery and chargeback system can promote the e-f-fective
and efficient management and use of ADP resources." CRef.
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E. SUMMARY
By the early 1970' s. Marine Corps computing could easily
be associated with the third (control) stage of Nolan's
organizational model for ADP development CRef. 363.
Management and control of ADP resources were centralized
under the management of the Headquarters, Marine Corps ADP
staff. The MCCDPA's had a tightening grip on systems
development. Because of resource limitations, controls
>8
became so restrictive that new system development and growth
virtually ceased.
In -fact, it could be argued that regression occurred to
the point that users became initiators (Nolan's -first stage)
outside, or at least separated from, the of-ficial control
structure of new technology. As requirements grew and
contagion (Nolan's second stage) set in, the user
development structure reached compromise with the ADP
management structure and new systems development began in
earnest.
The current situation can best be characterized as the
beginning of a second iteration of the third stage
(control). Even users agree that effective control is again
required. Central management (through the ISSC) is again
being attempted; this time at a level higher than either ADP
management or the user community. Finally, chargeback is
being considered as a way of rationing ADP resources and
reducing the load on the ISSC. The goal should be to create
a system of control which will not stifle growth and which
will allow movement toward Nolan's fourth stage of maturity.




The Marine Corps ADP management must deal with more
than internal problems. The problems discussed in the
preceding chapters are complicated by external regulations
and political realities over which the Marine Corps has
little control.
B. LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS
Perhaps the biggest problem -facing any Department of
Defense ADP manager is the requirement to match Life Cycle
Management issues and Federal Procurement Regulations with
responsiveness to user needs and technological change.
Under current regulations, new systems development involves
extensive and detailed documentation and justification.
These documentation requirements are based on the fact that
new systems, both hardware and software, are expensive.
Both systems development and equipment procurement are often
slow and tedious processes because all requirements must be
spelled out in excruciating detail and be reviewed at
numerous management levels. In the meantime, both
requirements and technology can change to the degree that
some systems are obsolete by the time they are approved.
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C. PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS
Even -For approved systems, procurement difficulties are
well documented. The Navy's Automatic Data Processing
Selection Office (ADPSO) estimates 368 days to contract for
a moderate size requirement which has been well defined in
advance and has no particular technical or regulatory
problems CRef. 373. Often, contracting authorities are
reluctant to commence work on a contract until funds are
provided. Thus, even well -managed ADP projects have
difficulty achieving contract award in the year in which
procurement funding is first provided. Even wel 1—planned,
on—time projects may begin with one strike against them in
the budget review process.
D. BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
Within this framework of uncertainty caused by the LCM
and Federal Procurement Regulations, the ADP manager must
also maintain his funding and defend his ADP program through
the POM and Budget Cycle. Under current regulations, a new
system cannot come under full scale development without POM
approval. It also must show funding 'executabi 1 i ty* , i.e.,
contract award during the year for which funds are budgeted.
A problem occurs when the LCM milestones are stretched
beyond the length of the POM cycle due to changes in
requirements or technical and regulatory difficulties. The
program becomes a candidate for a 'mark' (i.e., funding
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reduction) by budget analysts. Budget marks, even when
valid, are bad -For the political reputation o-f the project
and the project manager. Thus, in order to achieve budget
'executabi li ty*
,
programs are often pushed through without
requirements updates or with unresolved technological
problems. Because the contracting takes so long, ADP
equipment procurements must o-f ten start be-fore all system
requirements are fully defined. Parallel action of hardware
procurement and software development is envisioned to speed
final implementation. Sometimes it does. Other times,
however, it causes a mismatch of equipment and requirements.
E. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY REGULATIONS
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76,
Commercial Industrial Type Activities, was originally issued
in 1955 and has been periodically revised and amended. This
Circular is the Federal government's current policy
statement concerning the 'make or buy' or contracting—out
decision process associated with commercial type activities.
A commercial type activity is one which provides a product
or service needed by the Federal Government. The genesis of
A—76 was within the Eisenhower Administration and its
original premise was that the government should not compete
with private industry in commercial/industrial type
activities. More specifically, whenever possible,
government required commercial type goods or services should
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be procured through the private sector. This policy was
implemented and revised in a continuing series of Bulletins
issued by the Bureau o-f the Budget and its successor, the
OMB.
In its latest version. A—76 actually requires
competition with the private sector ERef. 381.
Specifically, it requires -federal agencies to inventory
their commercial and industrial activities, to compare costs
of doing the job in—house or by contracting—out , and to
pursue, within specified objectives, the least cost
alternative. Only commercial and industrial type activities
apply under the provisions of A—76. Governmental functions
are to be retained in—house. These are functions
'inherently governmental in nature' that in the public
interest must only be performed by Federal employees.
Governmental functions have been broadly categorized by A—76
as those that pertain to the act of governing or those that
pertain to monetary transactions and entitlements. The
'management and direction of the Armed Services' is also
defined within A—76 as a governmental function within the
act of governing. This means that contracting—out
management functions within DoD is not allowed; only
commercial and industrial type activities may be considered
for contracting—out . Additionally, governmental operation of
a commercial activity is authorized when no satisfactory
private or commercial source is available or the commercial
activity is operated by military personnel in an area o-f
national defense. Also excluded are those commercial
activities which provide appropriate work assignments for
military career progression or a military rotation base -for
overseas assignments. These exclusions exempt -from the A—76
process those commercial type activities within DoD that
quali-fy as national defense areas or those activities -for
which no acceptable private or commercial source is
avai lable.
Although most Marine Corps data processing requirements
are commercial type applications and have been included in
the Marine Corps Commercial Activities inventory, there has
to date been minimal contracting-out o-f ADP. While the
required studies are being performed, it appears that most
Marine Corps data processing activities will be exempted
from commercial contracting. Exemptions have been justified
on the national defense needs of Fleet Marine Force units,
staffing necessary to meet rotation base requirements, and
the prohibition of contracting—out governmental functions.
Complying with the provisions of A-76 presents a series
of on—going and recurring management challenges. The
recurring requirement to inventory all commercial type
activities maintains the visibility of all identified
commercial activities. Those activities which are exempt
for whatever reason must have their exemption status
revalidated every fifth year. This requirement imposes
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uncertainties that must be considered and included within
appropriate contingency plans. In most cases, however, if
an activity initially quali-fies for an exemption to A—76, it
should continue to requalify for the exemption based on the
same justification.
For the military services, and the Marine Corps in
particular, ADP should continue to qualify for exclusions to
A-76. The deployment requirement o-f FMF units along with
the need to maintain a rotation base should continue to
exclude all FMF ADP assets and most supporting ADP assets.
Additionally, the nature of some of the programs, such as
the flying hour program or the Five Year Defense Plan, can
be considered as proprietary in nature and would clearly not
be in the best interests of the government to be
contracted—out
.
In spite of its defensive posture toward A—76, Marine
Corps data processing management is not averse to
contracting—out ADP operations. While there are many
differences in political opinion concerning commercial
contracting, Marine Corps ADP planners recognize that
current in—house ADP assets will not handle currently
documented requirements. Commercial contracting of new
systems development started as a way of handling temporary
'surges' in programming needs. It has become a 'normal'
process because the 'surges' have become permanent, but
personnel increases to handle them have not been possible
due to manpower ceilings. Even if authorization -for hiring
was possible, the expertise required was not available at
civil service or military wage rates. The 'surges' in new
systems have created a surge in capacity requirements which
has been difficult to manage internally. One possible
method for handling the surge would be to contract for some
or all ADP operations allowable under A-76 regulations. The
fundamental question is whether the Marine Corps can manage
its contractors as well as it can its in-house operations.
Given difficulties in equipment procurement regulations,
civil service and military pay restrictions, and the rising
tide of demand for service, the Marine Corps may have no
choice.
F. ADP COST ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS
A second OMB Circular, A-121, Cost Accounting, Cost
Recovery and Inter—Agency Sharing of Data Processing
Facilities, was published in 1980. This Circular's intent
was to "promote effective and efficient management and use
of certain data processing facilities" through adherence to
the following business— 1 i ke procedures:
"(1) Account for the full cost of operating data
processing facilities;
(2) Allocate all costs to users according to the service
they receive;
(3) Share excess data processing capacity with other
agencies;
(4) Recover the cost of inter—agency sharing; and
(5) Evaluate inter—agency sharing as a means of
supporting major new data processing applications."
CRef. 391
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The Circular is applicable to all data processing facilities
which are operated by, or on behal-f of, a Federal agency;
provide service to more than one user; operate one or more
general management computers; and exceed $100,000 per year
for the full cost of operation CRef. 40D.
The procedures which prescribe full costing and
allocation of all costs to users based on services received
have the potential for causing the most impact on ADP
activities. To date, Marine Corps ADP activities have been
mission funded. The identification of full costs within a
mission funded activity is a difficult task. A variety of
funding sources are often involved with different accounting
and management systems. Given that all direct and indirect
costs could be defined, the accounting system would also
have to be able to support the cost capturing and reporting.
Allocating all costs to users could even have more of an
impact for ADP activities. Accomplishment of this objective
will require the necessary visibility within the accounting
systems to support the identification and assignment of
costs to the users.
To date, the DoD implementing directive for 0MB A— 121
has not been released. Accordingly, the Marine Corps has
adopted a 'wait and see 7 attitude; there is a reluctance to
independently implement the Circular's provisions without
first receiving the detailed implementing directives from
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the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . The obvious
danger in this attitude is that the OSD implementing
directive may be forthcoming at any time with little
conversion time allowed. As a result, the intended impact
of A— 121 has not been realized. When the DoD implementing
directive is released, the military services will have to
respond accordingly to the policies and procedures of OMB
A-121. Appropriate contingency planning is necessary to
ensure that conversion to the business-like procedures




A. ALLOCATION AND LEVEL OF EFFORT DETERMINATION
There are two basic economic tasks in the management o-f
ADP resources. One task is to allocate ADP resources; the
second task is to set the appropriate level o-f effort. Both
tasks require efficient operation and e-f-fective management
decision making.
Similarly, although there are levels o-f degree, there
are essentially two methods o-f accomplishing the two basic
tasks. One method is the use o-f centralized planning and
allocation wherein a central planning committee determines
the level o-f effort allowable and the allocation of
resources, setting quotas for results in accordance with an
overall plan. The second method is a more decentralized
approach where decisions concerning allocation of resources
and level of effort are delegated to lower—level management
based on tradeoffs faced by the local manager between the
price of a commodity and its value for accomplishment of the
overall tasks.
There are deficiencies in both methods. The first
offers efficiencies based on standardization and economies
of scale. Such planning is complex, however, and mistakes
result in ineffective use of resources (both shortages and
surplus). The decentralized approach is more effective at
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the local level because individual managers use only the
resource mix best able to accomplish their assigned mission.
There may be ine-F -f iciencies in integration, however, due to
the lack o-f standardization. Also, costs may be higher
where economies o-f scale apply.
In the classical market, entities which are ineffective
or inefficient are weeded out by the necessity for profit.
Thus, to the extent that market forces are in effect,
surviving entities are relatively wel 1—designed in scale
(level of effort) and resource allocation method
(centralized versus decentralized) based on their individual
envi ronment
.
Government agencies, however, do not generally have the
threat of the market. (Other activities also try to reduce
the threat of the market, as well, by political action
vis—a—vis import quotas, subsidies, etc.) Level of effort
is determined by the appropriation process and allocation by
apportionment of the appropriation within the government
agency. Both effectiveness and efficiency must be achieved
by means other than the market. Alternative measures of
output and input have been developed which attempt to
measure both efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency in
providing a specific output is often measurable using
quantitative techniques; effectiveness is generally a more
nonquantitati ve, subjective value judgment CRef. 41 1.
Government agencies therefore tend to be more concerned with
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the subjective perception o-f their effectiveness by their
overseers (be it Congress or another government agency) than
with actual effectiveness. The overseer should therefore
attempt to ensure that perceptions and reality coincide to
the greatest extent possible by developing evaluation
criterion which can provide some objectivity to the
judgement process.
For some forms of government activity, injecting some of
the market mechanism into the evaluation process may be
helpful. OMB Circular A—76 makes the notion of competition,
where possible, into policy. It lets the level of internal
effort by the government be decided by the market.
Additionally, the basic "criterion for selecting Industrial
Funding is its appropriateness for exploiting the
buyer—seller relationship." CRef. 42D As long as the buyer
and seller are separate entities, even a captive customer
will not be inhibited from exercising the right to complain
to higher authorities if billings are excessively larger
than charges for comparable commercial services. Thus,
market prices can become at least a measure of efficiency,
even where the buyer is 'captive', provided similar external
products exist.
B. ADP MARKET PRICING
ADP is included as one of those government activities
for which some degree of market pricing may be valuable.
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FIPS Pub 96 suggests full absorption pricing and internal,
as well as external, chargeback and billing ERef. 433. This
means, essentially, that users o-f ADP services should pay
the entire burden -for ADP services.
Schechinger and Prack ERef. 443 have demonstrated that,
according to classical economic theory, covering the entire
expense o-f ADP operations may not be the most e-f-ficient
method o-f allocation. The essential facts discussed by
Schechinger and Prack are as follows. According to
classical economic theory, maximum efficiency in the use of
resources occurs when resources are priced such that the
marginal cost of a unit of output equals its marginal
revenue. Computing power has generally been considered
subject to Grosch's Law which asserts that increasing
returns to scale are the norm for computer processing ERef.
453. As argued by Schechinger and Prack ERef. 463,
"First, for a given output under increasing returns to
scale, the price will be established at the intersection
of the marginal value (MR) and the marginal cost <MC)
curves such that the computer center will not recover its
total costs. The price PI and the quantity Ql are
determined where MC = MR but at this price the computer
center will sustain losses of (Cl-Pl) Ql and will not
recover its costs." (Figure 5—1)
Thus, the assumption of increasing returns to scale means
that marginal cost pricing would require a subsidy to cover
the average costs, or conversely, that average cost pricing
would be too high, thus inhibiting desirable computer usage.
12 3T
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Figure 5—1 Pricing Under Increasing Returns to Scale
The conclusions drawn by Schechinger and Prack are valid
to the extent that quantity demanded is relatively -fixed;
i.e., the customer base is captive. In the more dynamic
situation, where the customer is not so captive, competitive
factors exist which either -force elimination or serious
scaling down o-f service i-f subsidies are not provided. In
Figure 5—1, i-f quantity demanded is reduced to Q2 from the
optimal production at Ql because a better price is available
elsewhere, the average cost price will be raised to C2. I-f
full reimbursement at average cost is required, as it is for
industrial -Funds, prices will continue to rise as output
volume is reduced unless quantity demanded becomes -fixed by
regulation. This occurs in spite o-f the fact that
increasing utilization will actually lower overall costs and
improve efficiency. Thus, to keep costs down, mandated use
of an industrial fund activity which exhibits increasing
returns to scale would appear to be a requirement in spite
of apparent higher costs, so long as prices must be based on
average cost.
This situation is illustrated by the experiences of the
Military Airlift Command (MAC) CRef. 473. As an industrial
funded activity, MAC was required to price on an average
cost basis. Because alternative transportation could be
priced at a marginal cost lower than MAC's average cost, all
services tend to use MAC only to the extent required by
regulation. For example, using organic or even commercial
ground transport from Camp Pendleton, CA to Twenty—Nine
Palms, CA can be considerably cheaper out-of-pocket since
vehicle depreciation is not directly considered. The result
is even higher prices for the remaining MAC users and a
smaller than optimal MAC organization. It follows that
computing, to the extent increasing returns to scale are
evident, would have similar results.
There are compensating factors, however. First, limits
to Grosch's law are becoming apparent as computers grow in
size and complexity to the point where operating system
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overhead becomes the most significant resource consumer
CRef. 48H. In software development, the cost o-f complexity
and large systems integration may overcome the scale
economies associated with standardized procedures and
resource sharing. Thus, it may be that as computing
matures, the traditional economic concept o-f initial
increasing returns to scale, -followed by diminishing
returns, and finally negative returns at excessive scale,
may come into play.
C. DIFFERENTIAL PRICING FOR ADP SERVICES
The above discussion of average cost pricing assumes a
single product and a single price for that product. There
are actually many ADP service 'products' which can be priced
differently in a form of market segmentation based either on
competitive position or demand. It is logical to assume
that some products can be priced sufficiently above marginal
cost to capture fixed overhead while other products Bre
priced to cover only marginal cost.
The above discussion also assumes a single price for
like ADP services- In practice, the single price may be
difficult to develop. "It is not absolutely correct to say
a job should be charged in proportion to systems resources
used, since high usage of a single resource can inhibit the
use of other systems resources." CRef. 493 Thus, a system
which uses eighty percent of available CPU memory might be
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considerably more than twice as costly in real terms,
because o-f congestion, than one which only uses forty
percent. In the same manner, a new system which uses the
last twenty percent of capacity, thus forcing an equipment
upgrade, can be said to cost more in real terms than the old
system which used thirty percent but was not the driving
force for the upgrade requirement.
A similar situation results from the peak load pricing
problem. The average cost of the current load is very low
because high utilization spreads fixed costs thinly. Any
additional load imposed during peak periods would require a
significant equipment upgrade and therefore a jump in fixed
costs causing higher average costs for all users. It is
therefore rational to charge a higher price to these new
systems based on their higher marginal cost. It may also be
rational to charge more to all peak period users. This may
not be possible until contract renewal where contracts are
already in place or until rate recalculation where
operations are conducted under industrial fund stabilized
rates.
During non—peak periods, or at any time when utilization
is low, the marginal cost for additional usage is below
average cost. Greater utilization can be encouraged by
pricing additional usage below average cost, so long as the
original set of users are content to pay enough to cover the
overhead necessary to cover average costs. While this
appears tD violate the industrial fund mandate -for average
cost pricing whereby "the industrial -fund activity shall
secure -full reimbursement -for all goods and services
produced" ERef. 503, there is considerable latitude at the
individual product level. The latitude is a result o-F the
fact that ADP operations costs on multiple user systems are
primarily indirect costs -for which "any generally accepted
method that is reasonably accurate and simple may be used to
allocate indirect costs to individual jobs or services."
CRef . 513 General Accounting Office guidelines actually
suggest different rates to properly "reflect the additional
cost (both investment and operating) incurred to have enough
equipment, personnel, and software to provide for the peak
period, faster, or additional services." CRef. 523
GAO's guideline approving differential costing leaves
room to adjust prices by application, a form of market
segmentation, while allowing the industrial fund to recover
all costs. This involves combining the two separate and
often conflicting requirements to maintain stable rates and
also breakeven in terms of financial gain and loss. Initial
stabilized rates for each application are based on overall
average cost criteria (perhaps adjusted to encourage
non—peak usage or to respond to market conditions) necessary
to breakeven. New applications are priced at marginal cost,
either higher or lower than average costs. Rates for old
customers are prevented from adjustment to ^equality 7 by the
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requirement -for stable prices -for each product. New
applications are appropriately encouraged or inhibited by
setting prices based on the need to breakeven. Once
applications are established, however, they are gradually
repriced toward average cost as part of the changes in
budgeted stabilized rates for future budget years. This may
encourage system 'churning' whereby users attempt to get a
lower rate by continually updating their applications.
Accordingly, pricing for replacement systems would have to
include the overhead which would have been charged to the
system they replace.
This pricing method can only be effective where pricing
is based on output with separate prices for each
application. Since output rates set by application are
actually different products, new applications require new
rates which can reflect current conditions. Stabilized
rates based solely on internal resource utilization do not
have this flexibility because resource—based rates would
cross product lines and, in an industrial fund, could not be
adjusted during a fiscal year without approval of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) CRef. 533.
While the goal of pricing in a government agency must
include cost recovery, the methods of achieving cost
recovery can include a variety of pricing techniques as long
as certain basic norms are not violated. Bernard CRef. 543
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describes the norms, or characteristics, of a good pricing
scheme as follows.
"Users must generally accept the scheme as equitable.
This does not necessarily mean that prices must adhere
rigidly to accounting costs, but deviations. . .wi 1
1
probably have to be justi-fied to the user community.
"The scheme must be understandable to users i-f they
are to be able to trace the cause of variations in
charges, intelligently seek ways of reducing them....
"It should, as far as possible, yield charges that are
controllable by the user.... Thus, if a user can make his
program more efficient or eliminate an unnecessary report
from a management information system, his charges should
change to reflect his actions and do so in a predictable
manner. ...
"...the pricing scheme should give reproducible
results. .. under conditions that vary outside the users
control, the charge for the job should remain reasonably
constant. ...
"Finally, there is a need for stability in the
charging structure.... Frequent changes in the charging
structure weaken users' ability to budget for and control
their charges."
Within these norms, prices may be set in a variety of
ways depending on the service to be provided. Internal
resource utilization is effective for strict timesharing
applications where the user develops and maintains his own
system and can have an effect on the resources used.
Output—related processing is generally considered most
appropriate where "the installation provides information
services, rather than raw resources." CRef. 551 Since the
price is based on outputs, computer centers are not
inhibited by reduced earnings from developing more efficient
methods of producing output. In addition, users can count
on stable, predictable prices regardless of overall computer
center efficiency or inefficiency. Flat rate pricing for a
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particular level or volume might also be e-f-fective where it
"reduces the uncertainty in revenue and demand -faced by the
computer center, as well as the uncertainty in budgeting
-faced by the user." CRef. 563 Finally, di-f -f erential pricing
between users -for what are apparently the same resources or
output measurements can be used to indirectly charge for
non—measurable services provided -for a specific user or to
distinguish "between different qualities of service in terms
of priority, response time, time of day, etc." CRef. 573
Previous research CRefs. 58,593 concluded that flexible
pricing was not allowed based on an undated NavCompt counsel
memorandum. In fact, flexible pricing is recommended by GAO
guidelines contained in FBAP 4 CRef. 603. The correct
conclusion is that any combination of pricing techniques can
be applied, but the prices used will only be successful to
the extent that they are rationally and consistently applied
in accordance with the norms listed in the previous
paragraph.
D. BUREAUCRACY, COMPETITION, AND THE MARKET
It can be said that the primary, although perhaps not
formally documented, focus of an organizational bureaucracy
is self—preservation, with growth following closely in
second place. This statement can be derived from
achievement motivation theory which holds that individual
managerial behavior in an organization is "influenced by a
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desire -for success (achievement), a search -for power and a
need for affiliation." CRef. 613 A-f f i 1 i ati on provides a
-feeling of personal security, which is endangered by any
threat to the organization. Growth improves chances -for
promotion (a measure of personal success) and power as it
creates the opportunity to increase the number of people
and/or value of assets an individual controls CRef. 623.
There are examples in business where growth becomes more
important than the traditional concept of profit
maximization CRef. 633 and corporate goals are stated in
terms of maximizing sales subject to a certain minimum level
of profit CRef. 643. It follows that industrial funded
government activities have the same basic incentives and
goals as commercial industry except that the acceptable
profit margin can be reduced to zero.
This situation should give the industrial funded
activities a pricing advantage in a competitive situation.
Under competition, managers will be encouraged by the
organizational incentive for growth to accept work at lower
margins than comparable commercial firms. A brake on growth
is the requirement to break even overall, which encourages
efficient operation in order to accommodate growth. Since
industrial funds must use average cost pricing on an overall
basis, output may never reach the theoretical ideal where
marginal cost equals marginal revenue. However, the very
real incentives to operating efficiency may outweigh the
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theoretical inefficiencies o-F operating at some deviation
from marginal cost pricing-
Remove competition, however, and the organizational
incentive for growth reverses its effect- When output is
strictly a function of plan, size can no longer be a
function of efficiency. In fact, given a fixed output, size
becomes a function of how inefficient a bureaucracy can
become without getting into regulatory or audit agency
problems. Thus, once competition is eliminated, significant
regulatory effort (another bureaucracy) is required to
monitor efficiency. Bureaucracy begets itself CRef. 65D.
E. SUMMARY
As with all theoretical discussion, actual
implementation of the concepts presented in this and
preceding chapters in a practical situation would be
difficult at best. The primary conclusion of this chapter
should be that there are incentives provided by economic
forces. If these forces can be kept from conflict with
regulatory edicts, organizational planning, and social
norms, an effective control mechanism for governmental
commercial activities is available. The 'invisible hand' of
the market can work, but only to the extent that it is not
stopped by an 'invisible brick wall 7 of ant i—market culture
and bureaucratic regulation.
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VI. CHARGEBACK AND ADP
A. INTRODUCTION
"A corporation may decide not to charge -for computer
services. The user could then consider computer services
free. This is like opening the -floodgates on a dam.
A-fter the initial rush only a trickle remains to address
corporate needs...." CRe-f. 663
The same description is as relevant to data processing
within the federal government. When users are unaware of
the costs of processing their computer applications, there
are few incentives in place for the users to pursue cost
efficient ADP applications. For this reason, chargeback has
been considered by Marine Corps ADP planners as an aid in
allocating scarce ADP resources. For the same reason,
i
chargeback is mandated, at least to some extent, by
regulatory agencies. There are t however, both pros and cons
to chargeback, as well as a variety of ways to accomplish
implementation.
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHARGEBACK
In the early days of business computing, emphasis was on
converting as many functional applications to the computer
system as possible CRef. 67D. Computers and use of
computing services had to be justified by the workload that
was being serviced. To encourage computer use, customers
were not charged for the cost of their computer services.
The cost of computer support was usually treated as an
overhead item. As a result, the number o-F user applications
increased rapidly as did the costs o-f providing the computer
services. A means to control and manage the applications
and cost growths was necessary. Charging back to users the
costs o-f operating and even developing specific applications
was generally considered as a means to manage growth as well
as increase the efficiency of ADP operations and usage.
Early chargeback techniques worked well in
uniprocessor—based, non—multiprogramming environments. As
computer systems increased in complexity, chargeback
techniques had to adapt to accommodate such features as
multiple users and concurrent processing CRef. 68D. Despite
the increased complexity of chargeback management, the use
of chargeback has continued to grow in popularity. In a
recent survey of Fortune 1000 companies, 83.8 percent of the
responding companies have a policy of charging users for all
or some portion of data processing operations and systems
development services CRef. 693.
C. REASONS FOR CHARGEBACK
The suitability for the use of chargeback within an
organization is heavily dependent upon the organizational
environment in which the computer system operates. Four
suggested reasons for the existence of chargeback systems
are:
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"1. Accurately state the total costs o-F user
departments. ...
2. Avoid provision o-f unnecessary or unjust i-fied
services. ...
3. Ensure that the DP department, itself, -functions in a
cost-effective manner....
4. Encourage the judicious use of specific resources."
CRef. 703
An advantage often cited for the use of chargeback is
that a better allocation of resources will be attained.
Since the responsibility for the cost management of user
applications is borne by the user, applications with little
or no marginal value are likely to be discontinued.
Incentives in the forms of budgetary constraints and pricing
considerations are in place and the user will strive for the
effective and economical use of ADP services. The use of
chargeback should also result in a better allocation of
resources at the data processing centers themselves. The
data processing center must operate on a more businesslike
basis as costs of processing applications must be developed,
reviewed, and justified CRef. 71 1. Increased user awareness
and interest in the costs of data processing also forces
efficiencies on the data center.
D. CRITICISMS OF CHARGEBACK
Criticism of chargeback can be generalized into three
categories. First, administration of the chargeback system
i
can be expensive. One study has claimed that
"administrative and operating costs for a chargeback system
often ranged from 6 percent to 24 percent of the total EDP
budget." CRef. 723 Second, if sufficient controls are not
maintained on data center operations, it may actually
decrease, instead o-f increase, internal efficiency. With
users paying the bill, there is no reason to worry about
cost unless that worry is imposed by some other control
mechanism CRef. 733. Finally, chargeback can restrict
innovation. New applications with untested solutions may
not be given a chance because of the cost considerations
CRef. 743.
E. POSSIBLE MARINE CORPS CHARGEBACK METHODOLOGIES
Chargeback can be implemented in a variety of ways.
Essentially, there are three chargeback methodologies
applicable to Marine Corps data processing: statistical
chargeback; reimbursable chargeback; and industrial funding,
1 . Statistical Chargeback
This method involves cost measurement only without
user billing. Separate mission -funding of the various
commands would continue, but costs by AIS would be gathered
and reported to both users and ADP management for
* information' purposes. This method has been recommended
for the Marine Corps in at least one study CRef. 753 and in
fact may be the best interim solution to the chargeback
probl em.
There are several advantages. First, it does not
require reorganization of command or financial structures.
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Potential turmoil in an extensive reorganization could be
very costly. Second, it does provide better tracking of AIS
costs -for evaluation by ADP planners, -financial decision
makers, and reports to regulatory agencies. Finally,
statistical chargeback meets cost recovery and reporting
requirements established by OMB Circular A—121. The Marine
Corps is not required to bill ADP users since it provides
virtually no ADP resources to users outside the Marine
Corps. It must, however, identify all costs in sufficient
detail "that the cost data collected using these procedures
can also be used with appropriate adjustments, but without
recompi 1 at ion, to support any cost analysis conducted. .. in
accordance with OMB Circular A—76 and supplemental
instructions thereto." CRef. 763
Criticism of statistical chargeback can be made from
two directions. First, it is ineffective because it has no
direct regulatory effect. Statistical costs have often been
criticized as being 'so what' costs since cost data is
reported for information purposes only. Second, if
statistical chargeback is to be made effective, it is not so
inexpensive as it might initially appear.
The 'ineffectiveness' criticism has historical
justification. At one time, an ADP resource reporting
system, the Resources Cost and Utilization System (RESCU)
,
was used by Headquarters, Marine Corps <C4 Division) to
provide input on CPU utilization by AIS. RESCU was also "to
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have been supplemented by statistical and indirect costs
reported by other means." CRef. 771 This system was never
fully implemented. Software maintenance on the RESCU system
was given such low priority that the system had to be
abandoned as obsolete when new equipment was introduced.
Subsequently, a commercial so-ftware package called the Job
Accounting and Reporting System (JARS) was purchased. JARS,
however, has not been used significantly for either the
purposes of allocating or reporting costs. It is not that
JARS is a particularly bad program for its purpose; it is
just that sufficient resources have not been allocated to
JARS to allow calculation and publication of fully
tabulated, accurate results. The problem is that there are
no 'teeth' in a purely statistical system. As Cash et al
.
CRef. 781 state, "A memo about a charge does not have the
same bite as the actual assignment of the charge." Both
users and ADP managers lack interest in a system which has
no direct financial effect. As such, there is a reluctance
to commit significant resources to the system to ensure its
Accuracy or to take the command interest necessary to
enforce its effective use.
Command interest would be expensive. It would
require the commitment of significant resources to develop a
comprehensive cost gathering system in parallel with the
current financial accounting systems. Operations and
Maintenance <0?cM> cost data would have to be drawn from the
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-formal accounting system with audit cross—checks provided-
Formulas for allocation o-f all costs (to include
administrative overhead, utilities, and depreciation o-f both
hardware and software) to the various AIS's would be
required. A -fairly extensive reporting system along with
assignment o-f 'responsibility' -for costs would also be
required to ensure user awareness. Because statistics can
be used for questionable purposes, there would also have to
be some form of auditability for data provided. Finally,
although data on which to base decisions would be better,
the present allocation bureaucracy would still be required
to determine the share of ADP resources to be allocated to
each user. The backlog would not disappear. In short, the
limited benefits of statistical chargeback in terms of user
and management awareness have not been considered worth the
resources required to make statistical cost calculation
truly effective as a control on ADP systems development and
operations costs.
2. Reimbursable Chargeback
The requirement for reimbursement by users would put
'teeth' in the system. This method assumes continued
mission funding for ADP resources with mission funded
facilities being reimbursed for services rendered. It
offers the opportunity to tailor chargeback to the level
considered appropriate by ADP planners. Billing for
activities which Are to be encouraged, or activities for
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which the users have little control, can be kept low or
absorbed entirely by the ADP facilities. Other
requirements, such as rush jobs or special jobs with very
high utilization of critical resources, can be billed at
full incremental cost. Thus, billing can be used as a
management tool without the rigid controls of stabilized
rates and breakeven requirements imposed by Industrial
Funds.
The problem with this method is defining both the user
and the provider. Mission funding is provided through a
hodgepodge of different sources. Users may be providers, or
even more confusing, partial providers of the resources used
by a system. Finally, one AIS is often funded through more
than one operating budget. For example, a single query to a
personnel record located at MCCDPA, Kansas City from a
terminal located in Camp Hansen, Okinawa would involve use
of equipment and resources owned by RASC, Okinawa; RASC,
Hawaii; RASC, Camp Pendleton; and MCCDPA, Kansas City. It
would also use leased data communications lines funded
separately through HQMC and equipment procured through the
Procurement, Marine Corps appropriation. This single
transaction would involve five separate operating budgets,
four separate Budget Programs, and two separate
appropriations.
Who is to be reimbursed and how that reimbursement is to
be allocated among the various providers of funds could be
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tracked through a complicated series o-f utilization
measurement and resource billing so-ftware, but the operating
system overhead would be significant. The sheer volume o-f
accounting transactions required to reimburse the various
service providers would be an even bigger problem.
Management o-f ADP reimbursables is too complicated and too
expensive to be considered on a practical basis, without a
significant realignment of organizational structure.
Reorganization of ADP resources which serve multiple
users into a single command with the generalized mission of
ADP support could help in solving the user
—
provider
definition dilemma. It would, however, make Marine Corps
data processing susceptible to the required chargeback of
'full costs' under OMB Circular A— 121 since there would no
longer be any question that it served multiple users. This
would negate the possibility of using partial chargeback
schemes. As such, it would require a chargeback system
similar to the accounting system required for an industrial
fund. In fact, as will be discussed later in Chapter VII,
the Naval Data Automation Command chose industrial fund
accounting because Congress required 'full chargeback 7 as a
result of a similar reorganization CRef. 791.
3. Industrial Funding
Industrial fund accounting does provide for 'full
costing- . It provides the visibility required by OMB
Circular A-121. It eliminates the user's perception of ADP
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as a 'free resource'. It does require additional accounting
e-f-fort, but it can reduce administrative costs for new
system development if dollars are used instead of
bureaucracy to make allocation decisions. Finally,
regulations were changed to allow internal funding for
investment items CRef. 803. This change eliminates the need
for separate procurement appropriation requests, allowing
industrial funded activities to respond more quickly to
customer requirements than can be done through appropriated
funds. Because of these advantages, industrial funding
appears to be a viable solution, but there are serious
problems which must be considered before an industrial fund
solution can be considered CRef. 813.
The most important problem is minimizing overhead costs.
A cost gathering system will require all the emphasis
outlined for statistical chargeback in paragraph E. 1 above,
although it will not have to run as a duplicative parallel
to the formal accounting system as JARS does today CRef.
823. In addition, a billing system would be required. Both
must operate efficiently and at minimum cost, so that they
do not counter the beneficial impact of a wel 1—designed
chargeback system.
Another important problem is defining just who the
'user' is. That is, is the user the local unit which
physically uses the system? The local unit may have little
or no control over how often the system is processed since
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the system may be imposed by higher commands which direct
the processing frequency. On the other hand, there is local
control over the shi-ft schedule o-f users, and local
conditions also may a-F-fect error rates. Who is responsible?
The so—called 'buyer' must be determined if there is to be a
'buyer—seller relationship'.
Once a buyer is determined, is that buyer 'captive'? To
the extent that the buyer is directed by Headquarters,
Marine Corps to use a specific AIS, the user has no real
control over cost. Similarly, although captive AIS's may be
necessary to achieve economic utilization rates in an
industrial funded facility, there is no direct incentive for
efficient operation since cost increases can be routinely
passed to the user.
Regulations do not provide for accurate pricing.
"Because DoD does not allow for billing of military
(personnel) expenses between DoD activities, some ADP
facilities with heavy concentrations of civilian employees
would have higher costs than a facility with military
personnel." CRef. 83] Similarly, depreciation of equipment
not purchased by the industrial fund is a statistical but
not a billable cost, while depreciation of industrial fund
purchased equipment and/or lease costs are billable. Rates
could vary significantly between facilities for the same
basic service based on equipment mix.
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While industrial -funded ADP encourages 'standardization'
because non-standard requirements tend to cost more,
standardization can also be effectively en-forced by
centralized management. Industrial funding is not necessary
to promote standardization or cost efficiencies. Central
control and regulation can be just as effective.
Finally, there are serious organizational problems which
must be addressed prior to imposition of industrial funding.
Operational control and funding relationships would have to
be realigned. The accurate identification of all current
sources of financial support for ADP assets to be
transferred to the industrial fund would be a tremendous
effort in and of itself. The changes in command
relationships would also be traumatic. Are the benefits of
industrial funding worth the trauma and expense of such an
organizational realignment?
F. SUMMARY
While chargeback for ADP usage is an established fact in
most corporate environments and is 'encouraged' by
government agencies, there is still criticism that the
overhead involved in chargeback outweighs the benefit of
holding the user responsible for the cost of ADP
requirements. Three degrees of chargeback can be considered
applicable to Marine Corps structure. Statistical
chargeback is easiest to implement, but least effective for
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management or control. Mission -funded reimbursable
chargeback is desirable, but would require extensive
reorganization to be practical. Such a reorganization might
then force ful ly—costed chargeback in compliance with OMB
Circular A-121.
Given a requirement -for -ful ly—costed chargeback, there
are benefits to establishing an ADP industrial fund.
Industrial funding requires essentially the same accounting
techniques as mission funded reimbur sables. Also,
industrial funding offers a better response to procurement
requirements and fewer duplicative administrative controls.
Important considerations in establishing an industrial fund
include minimizing administrative overhead, establishing a
buyer-seller relationship, and maintaining effective and
efficient use of resources. Finally, to accomplish
industrial funding of ADP, the Marine Corps would need to
undergo significant organizational changes in the control of
ADP resources. Such a change could be traumatic.
VII. THE NAVDAC EXPERIENCE
A. REORGANIZATION
It was a reorganization of Navy ADP assets which
eventually led to the industrial funding o-f the Naval Data
Automation Command's (NAVDAC* s) computing assets. 2
Industrial -funding, or even chargeback, was not an original
goal o-f the reorganization effort. Rather, industrial
funding was the imposed result of a series of events
surrounding the reorganization.
NAVDAC was formed in 1977 when six separate Naval
Regional Data Automation Centers (NARDAC's) were combined
within a single command. The principal objectives of
NAVDAC, as defined by the Secretary of the Navy CRef. 843
"...to improve the effectiveness of ADP systems in support
of Navy operations, to exploit all the potentials of ADP
and teleprocessing technology in multi command and
multifunctional ADP systems, and to improve the overall
management of the Navy's ADP resources."
The one distinguishing feature of the facilities chosen to
become part of NAVDAC was the fact that all facilities were
"'This chapter draws heavily upon an interview conducted
by Major G.A. Ham and Captain R.M. Weidert with Mr. C.
Bolter, Deputy Comptroller, NAVDAC; Mr. R. Wagner, Budget
Officer, NAVDAC; and Mr. V. Serio, Accounting Officer,
NAVDAC. The interview was conducted at the NAVDAC
Comptroller Office, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., on 6
November 1984.
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shared and provided services to a large variety o-f users
representing many different major claimants.
After the reorganization was accomplished, reimbursement
on any large scale was not initially envisioned. A program
o-f statistical chargeback was developed to accumulate
utilization and develop statistical reports. Additionally,
mission -funded reimbursables were accepted -from some users
to obtain the resources necessary to provide support beyond
the level allowed within NAVDAC budget constraints.
Beginning in FY 1982, it became Department o-f the Navy
policy to discontinue even this level of reimbursable
funding for ADP. Specifically, mission funding was reguired
except for the Navy Industrial Fund/Marine Corps Industrial
Fund and non—Department of the Navy customers. Accordingly,
the FY 1982 Congressional Budget included a fund transfer
from previous reimbursable customers to the NARDAC's. The
NARDAC's were to directly fund all internal operations and
accept no further intra-Navy reimbursable orders for ADP
services.
B. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Congressional interest in the NAVDAC reorganization was
primarily fueled by an April 1981 House Appropriations
Committee (HAC) Surveys and Investigations Staff (S&IS)
report entitled "Effectiveness and Operations of the Naval
Data Automation Command." The S&IS reported on various
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aspects o-f NAVDAC including its ef -fecti veness in managing
not only its own resources (including its regional data
processing centers), but the overall Navy Automatic Data
Processing program. The S&IS report concluded that NAVDAC
had been relatively ineffectual in carrying out it mission
responsibilities -from a Navy wide standpoint. Included
within this S&IS report was a recommendation "...that the
existing customer payback or charge—back be retained." ERe-f.
853 The basis for the HAC's position that the Navy should
provide its ADP services on a completely reimbursable basis
was that users should be allowed to make their own basic
economic decisions in de-fining their own level o-f ADP
support. This basis presumed that the individual Navy
commands and activities had sufficient flexibility to define
their own desired levels of ADP support ERef. 863.
C. THE NAVY'S RESPONSE
On 20 August 1982, the Navy adopted the HAC
recommendation that Navy Regional Data Automation Centers
(NARDAC's), the Naval Data Automation Facilities (NAVDAF's),
and respective subordinate activities be converted to a
pay—as—you—go basis. To avoid conflict with Navy policy
against intra—Navy mission funded reimbursement of any kind,
conversion to industrial funding was required. On
4 December 1982, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Program Budget Decision Number 402 approved the
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establishment o-f an ADP NIF activity group. Accordingly,
beginning on 1 October 1983 (FY 1984), all NARDAC's and
NAVDAF's under NAVDAC were to be funded through the NIF.
D. METHODOLOGY
Within NAVDAC, a Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) Transition
Team was formed to manage the conversion. Some o-f the
initial projects were administrative in nature and required
a great deal o-f e-f-fort to accomplish. These tasks included
the justification required to accompany and justify the NIF
charter request. Also, previously submitted Operations and
Maintenance budget submissions had to be recompiled for
presentation in NIF budget format.
The NAVDAC NIF Transition Team quickly recognized that
an immediate concern was the education of both its own
managers and its ADP customers with the operating
characteristics of an industrial fund. To keep everyone
within the NAVDAC community informed, a series of Transition
Status Reports were published. These reports were informal
in nature, issued as required, and the emphasis was on
expeditiously passing as much information as possible.
One of the first areas of importance was the
establishment of valid usage data for ADP services provided
to customers. All NAVDAC activities were required to review
the previous year's customer data and set up and maintain
current year customer data. This customer data was needed
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to support basic management decisions at each NARDAC
including capacity needs, hardware and software
requirements, and personnel needs. Additionally, the
previous year -funding base -for ADP had to be realigned from
the NAVDAC and NARDAC directly to the end users o-f the
computing services.
Extensive validation o-f customer data had to be
undertaken because statistical cost reports which were
designed to accumulate utilisation data were considered
suspect and thus unreliable for basing ADP budget
allocations. Since the customers had not been paying for
their computer services, they had paid little attention to
the statistical cost reports generated. Significant
adjustments among users 7 initial budget allocations were
required, once accurate data were developed.
Because of time constraints and cost considerations, a
new accounting system was not developed. The existing,
operational NIF accounting system at the Naval Ocean Systems
Center, San Diego was modified to meet minimum ADP
requirements. This NIF accounting system was chosen because
of its simplicity of design. Although there were some
conversion difficulties resulting from documentation
problems, the NAVDAC did succeed in adapting a non—ADP
oriented industrial fund accounting system to accommodate
ADP. It was decided that a single site should perform all
official accounting and the NARDAC, Pensacola was selected
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to serve as the NIF Authorized Accounting Activity for the
entire NAVDAC/NARDAC community.
Initially, rates to bill customers were to be
established for each individual -facility. The rates were to
be based on resources utilized at the planned operating
budget and expected service levels. The units o-f resource
measurement to be used to develop the rates (such as CPU
time, memory usage, etc.) were to be standard -from
si te—to—si te. Additionally, rates for each site were
planned to include shift differentials to distinguish
relative shift operating costs. Rates were to be
stabilized, in accordance with industrial fund regulations,
for an entire fiscal year.
The objective to establish individual rates for the
separate facilities was not realized. Instead, stabilized
standard rates (SSRs) for Fiscal Year 1984 were developed
and published by NAVDAC for use by all NARDAC's. Problems
with hardware, the chargeback system, and the lack of valid
historical usage data at some of the activities precluded
the use of separate rates in the first year. Additionally,
differences in equipment mix between owned and leased
equipment and differences in the civilian/military personnel
ratios at different sites made prices originally computed
vary significantly from site to site. SSRs were essentially
weighted averages based on costs throughout NAVDAC. Thus,
some activities would be expected to make a profit and
81
others to experience an equivalent loss over the year.
Since NAVDAC wishes pro-fit or loss responsibility to remain
at the individual NARDAC level, local rates were established
for Fiscal Year 1985 for most resources- Rates were
adjusted, however, so that no site could maintain a
significant price advantage due to large numbers of military
personnel or owned but fully depreciated equipment. Such
sites have been assigned to make a specified profit in
recognition of this situation while sites with leased
equipment and proportionally more civilian billets are
allowed a specified loss.
In accordance with industrial fund accounting
procedures, depreciation had to be recognized and billed to
customers. The first step was to identify and assign costs
to all investment assets. It was especially important to
identify all assets because the larger the base for which
depreciation was calculated, the larger the deprecation
charges. All investment procurements (items costing more
than $3,000 dollars) were to be centrally managed and funded
by NAVDAC s Central Investment Program (CIP) . The total
depreciation expense in any one year defines the total
amount of annual funding available for CIP procurements.
While a significant investment base was required to generate
sufficient depreciation to allow CIP procurement, too much
depreciation overhead forces prices higher than competitive
ADP providers.
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Finally, NAVDAC planners recognized that under
chargeback, some users could possibly -find less costly
processing alternatives than NAVDAC -facilities. Customers
Mould be able to make their own decisions regarding source
of ADP support. Since stabilized rates had to be set far in
advance of the budget year, rates could not be adjusted to
compensate for lost business. Therefore, it was considered
necessary to preserve the existing workload to protect the
rates initially established. A three year moratorium on
removing applications from NAVDAC facilities was proposed
but only a one year moratorium was accepted by the Deputy
Under the Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management).
This moratorium expired on 30 September 1984. Since this
date, the NARDAC's have been in a competitive market, where
customers can use other sources of ADP services if it is
more economical.
E. SUCCESSES
The NAVDAC was given only fifteen months to implement
industrial fund management. Such a change in operating
procedures represents substantial organizational change.
Yet, funds were reallocated, the new accounting system
implemented, and customers billed for services through the
industrial fund without severe complication. In fact,
official adjusted Accumulated Operating Results (AOR) for
FY 1984 amounted to a gain of $50,000 on total revenues of
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$155,039,000 [Ref. 873, a better match to target than most
well established industrial funded activities. In terms o-f
initial -financial performance, success cannot be questioned.
F. CONCERNS
The development o-f standard rates was one o-f the areas
o-f most concern to the NAVDAC planners. The lack o-f
reliable historical data caused serious di-f-ficulty in the
creation o-f rate estimates based on prior cost data. This
problem was aggravated by the lack o-f time available in
which to identify and capture costs. A time period of at
least three years was considered the minimum activity base
necessary to develop valid cost data for rate projections.
Another consideration is the mix of lease versus
purchased equipment. With purchased equipment, it is
difficult to adjust for varying service levels to meet
fluctuating demands. Leased equipment provides flexibility
in that the hardware mix can be more readily adjusted to
support the required processing level. This flexibility has
a short run price, but it does provide some long run
protection from such factors as excess capacity or outdated
equipment.
Since NAVDAC is now in a competitive market, a current
problem is how the criterion of more economical is to be
defined. Customers may be able to justify using an
alternative source if the rates charged by the NAVDAC
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facilities are higher. The potential problem is one of
sub—optimization. Customers may de-fine the most economical
costs in terms of their own out—of—pocket costs, rather than
overall costs to the Navy.
NAVDAC is currently experiencing some migration of
applications off its computers, particularly through
microcomputer applications. Many of these smaller
applications probably should be removed. To the extent that
applications support a single user, do not require
continuous access to a large scale database, or require
relatively insignificant computing power, small applications
may not be efficient for a large mainframe computer.
In response to the new competition, many of the NARDAC's
have begun limited marketing efforts to acquaint users with
the services available, and to bring new, more appropriate
applications on board. The backlog of requirements has not
disappeared. The NARDAC's problem is to convince users
that, with all the nuisance jobs out of the way, users can
be provided more timely, dependable support at a reasonable
price for the larger database and resource sharing
applications which form the optimal processing base.
One problem is that operation of many of these new
medium size systems can also be commercially contracted.
Commercial contractors can set initial prices close to
marginal cost, counting on contract adjustments due to
changing requirements to achieve future profits. Stabilized
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rates -for resource usage, especially if based on a
projection o-f unused capacity, make it hard to compete
because stabilized rates -for a particular fiscal year are
set more than a year in advance of the fiscal year to which
they apply and are not adjustable. Rates cannot even be
reduced to a new lower average cost resulting from increased
usage. Thus, it is hard to attract new users at the higher
stabilized rates even if, in the long term, rates could be
lowered based on increased usage.
G. OUTLOOK
The future of the NAVDAC managed industrial funded
activity can be described as guardedly optimistic. NAVDAC
has shown that ADP can be managed as an industrial fund.
While there have been user complaints concerning the cost of
ADP in a full costed industrial fund, it may be that this
user awareness is beneficial in the long run. The full cost
of a computer system is not hidden in several separate
appropri ati ons.
NAVDAC s primary concern is that it may not be able to
compete with other ADP resource providers. That it is
losing customers to microcomputer applications, since it now
charges for service, may actually be good for the Navy
because small applications may be more effectively used on a
microcomputer. If the NARDAC's cannot offer competitive
prices, it may be that NAVDAC will be forced to reduce its
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industrial fund operation to only those systems which must
be retained in—house -for 'government reasons 7 . I-f so, these
systems may pay a premium (similar to MAC users) due to lost
economies o-f scale. That premium can be reduced (although
not eliminated i-f economies o-f scale are evident) by
adjusting capacity in the industrial -fund to match the need.
Hope-fully, the savings achieved by appropriate migration of
systems to other equipment can more than offset the premium.
In the meantime, the incentive for efficiency is there.
Lower costs mean lower prices and lower prices mean more
customers and more jobs for the industrial fund. This
incentive alone may keep NAVDACs industrial fund
functioning. It may even allow it to grow, in spite of
stabilized rates and resource—based pricing.
H. SUMMARY
The Navy has shown that industrial funding of ADP can be
accomplished. It was done in a short time, with only
moderate conversion costs. There was some turmoil for its
managers and customers, but far less than might have been
expected. In part, the relative lack of turmoil was due to
the previous organizational restructuring which allowed the
transition to industrial funding to be managed through a
single, cohesive unit. There are still difficulties; but,
with competition, there is incentive to solve them.
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VIII. A MARINE CORPS PRESCRIPTION
A. INTRODUCTION
The Navy has shown that industrial -funding o-f ADP
resources is feasible. Although valid questions remain to
be answered, industrial -funding would also be possible -for
those Marine Corps ADP facilities which are connected via
the Marine Corps Data Network (MCDN) . In this chapter, a
description of the characteristics of an industrial funded
data processing network which would best suit the needs of
the Marine Corps will be presented. Generalized guidelines
for a proposed implementation will also be presented which
should minimize disruption of mission requirements and
provide for as smooth a transition as possible.
B. STRUCTURE
Industrial funding will require restructuring a
significant portion of Marine Corps ADP assets into an
organization similar to that of NAVDAC. The Marine Corps'
seven major processing sites are similar to the NARDAC's in
the sense that the sites serve several regional users and
run a variety of different Automated Information Systems
(AIS's). Although still funded by the local base or station
commander and under that commander's nominal control, the
Marine Corps processing sites are actually more integrated
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than the separate NARDAC's. The separate processing sites
are standardized in hardware and systems software. A large
percentage o-f their processing involves standardized AIS's
which have Marine Corps wide application. The sites are
also interconnected via the MCDN and a significant and
steadily increasing degree o-f processing involves data
communi cati ons.
Because of this high degree of integration and
similarity of structure, reorganization of a significant
portion of Marine Corps Data Processing assets into a single
industrial funded 'backbone' data processing capability,
organized around the MCDN structure, is possible. This
backbone would include mainframe processors, data
communications, data structure administration, standard
languages, protocols, and other systems software. The
organization would include the seven major sites, the
twenty—seven remote job entry (RJE) sites, all
interconnecting data communications lines, and the personnel
and other resources required for operation and support.
Users would be responsible for the design and maintenance of
their own applications within the framework provided,
although the industrial fund could provide these services to
the extent that it could compete with private industry
and/or the individual user. Specifically excluded would be
items of equipment used exclusively by a single user (such
as end—user computing equipment), specialized equipment not
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tied into MCDN, and any Fleet Marine Force deployable
equipment.
C. COSTING
The cost of the various resource 'pools' can be kept by
standard cost accounting methods whereby each 'pool * is
assigned an appropriate job order number and costs are
posted as they occur. Charges speci-fic to a particular user
(or AIS) could be posted directly to that account. This is
essentially the same process as that -followed by most
industrial funds, as well as most private -firms. Direct
costs are allocated to a particular job order while indirect
costs are assigned to an overhead pool, which is later
allocated to the various job orders via a predetermined
overhead application rate. Variances, the di-f-ference
between applied overhead and actual overhead, are then
applied as an adjustment to the final operating results.
The difference for ADP is that the application of
indirect costs cannot be reasonably based on a percentage of
direct costs, as is done in most manufacturing type
operations. First, most ADP costs in a multiprogramming
environment, other than system design and maintenance, are
indirect costs. Second, there are many different 'pools' of
indirect costs including CPU costs, data communications,
disk storage, tape storage, input—output , and the standard
administrative and factory (i.e., data processing
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operations) overhead. All sire used to different degrees by
di-f-ferent applications. Therefore, it is necessary to gain
a measurement o-f the usage by an application o-f as many of
these pools as possible, in order to apply charges as though
they were direct costs.
Most cost allocation schemes attempt continuous
measurement o-f the use o-f each resource pool by each
application as it runs, charging -for the resource at the
preplanned rate. The problem is that a single application
will use different amounts of many of the resources
depending on the program mix resident in the system,
creating different prices for the same output.
Additionally, there is considerable processing overhead in
measuring and pricing each resource separately during each
application run.
Exhaustive measurement and cost application for each
individual run is not necessary, and may even be duplicative
of tasks currently performed for capacity management.
Capacity management involves the analysis of system
utilization, determining where bottlenecks exist, and
forecasting future trends. Armed with cost data on the
various resource pools, and the utilization data by AIS
required for capacity management, an analyst could develop
statistically valid standard costs for overall resource
utilization by AIS. Such standard costs could form the
basis for valid cost estimates to be applied to AIS usage
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without extensive remeasurement each time an application is
run.
D. PRICING
The same basic methodology of combining capacity
management techniques with resource pool cost forecasts can
-form the cost basis for pricing decisions- In a commercial
firm, pricing a product to get a target rate of return
involves first what the market will accept, and second,
given that market, a determination of cost for the product
based on direct costs plus a rational allocation of indirect
costs. Fixed costs are allocated in pricing decisions only
to the extent that they represent the opportunity cost of
foregoing alternative production.
Industrial funds must, however, include fixed costs in
their pricing decisions. In general, current AIS prices
should bear the brunt of fixed costs (i.e., be priced to
cover projected average costs), with some allowance for peak
load pricing or similarly justified price variations.
Pricing for new AIS's should be initially based on marginal
cost (either higher or lower than average cost) and be
gradually adjusted over a period of years (perhaps three) to
average cost. Where increasing returns to scale are
evident, this method of pricing grants an advantage to new
systems and helps to reduce the tendency for chargeback to
inhibit new development. It also helps to fight the
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*buy— in"" by commercial firms by imitating their tactics.
Where increasing returns to scale are not evident, this
method forces the new user to absorb the additional cost
incurred, rather than spreading part of the cost to the
overall population of users.
In general, prices should be stated in terms of output
(transactions processed, pages printed, etc.) with separate
pricing for each AIS based on the statistically generated
standard cost in terms of resources consumed. This puts the
burden of efficient operation on the ADP manager where it
belongs, since the ADP manager, not the user, must pay for
excessive resource utilization per unit of output. At the
same time, it leaves the decision concerning effective use
to the user who must pay for the output received.
There are three variations from strict output pricing
which are appropriate. First, for a Marine Corps database
operation or any similar large—scale AIS, it may be
appropriate to levy a fixed charge to the sponsor of the AIS
for the fixed costs which can be allocated to it, in return
for smaller transaction charges to encourage its update and
validation. Second, should the industrial fund accept for
processing AIS's for which it has no statistical data or
which have significant variation in the level of resources
used (system test and development is a good example of the
latter), charges would have to be based on resource
utilization, since in this case resources and not outputs
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are the products provided- Finally, terminal usage -for a
particular AIS might be separately charged to the local user
on a connect time basis to encourage efficient terminal
utilization, while transactions through the terminal are
separately charged to the AIS sponsor.
A key to pricing ADP services in an industrial -Fund is
to maintain su-f-ficient pricing -flexibility to respond to
changing conditions, yet maintain the stability required by
industrial -fund regulations for good customer relations.
Price stability does not mean that the price of a one page
report for one AIS must be charged at the same price as a
one page report for another. The cost of generating the
reports could be considerably different. What it does mean
is that the price of generating one particular report (or
any one particular product) for a particular AIS cannot be
changed from the stabilized price unless the underlying
computation basis for the report is changed by the user.
It is this concept of changing requirements which
provides the opportunity for pricing flexibility. When the
industrial fund provides a new or substantially changed
product, the product can be priced at current costs. Old
customers are satisfied because pricing is dependable, yet
requirements for new customers can be priced at rates which




It is the administrative cost o-f the physical process of
billing and reimbursement which draws the concern of Marine
Corps accounting managers CRef. 883. The proposed
reorganization helps to reduce the billing problem by
providing a single source -for billings. While separate
sites, or even separate -functions within sites, might be
treated as separate cost centers, the entire network must be
treated as a single profit center -for billing purposes. To
do otherwise would de-feat the purpose o-f reorganization
(which is to end the confusion in price allocation between
sources of services rendered which cross budgetary lines).
Billings would be sent to appropriate users based on the
concept of who has control of the system. In general, major
AIS operation would be billed, on a consolidated basis, to
the functional sponsor who directs its use. Local
applications would be billed to the appropriate local major
command. Special requirements would be billed to whichever
organizational entity sponsors the request. Except for
terminal connect time, billings for an AIS for which usage
is directed by a higher authority would generally be billed
on a consolidated basis to the higher authority- This both
reduces the cost of administering the industrial fund and
encourages more effective use of ADP by senior and middle
managers.
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Competitive selection o-f ADP services will be
encouraged. Users will be required to include the ADP
industrial fund as a bidder for all projects in which it
chooses to participate. Conversely, only if a proposed AIS
is considered * governmental ? would commercial bidding be
forbidden. 'Contracts' would be developed between the
industrial fund and users for large projects or continued
operations of AIS's. Smaller operations could run on prices
quoted by the industrial fund for a particular operation.
All operations would require funding authorization by the
customer prior to the performance of services in accordance
with industrial fund regulations. To the extent that
economies of scale exist, it is necessary to weigh the cost
of possible lost efficiencies from underuti 1 ization against
the incentive for inefficiency inherent in serving a captive
user. This regulation presupposes that the 'governmental''
activities which would be mandated to the industrial fund
would provide sufficient activity to prevent severe
inefficiencies from underuti 1 ization of possible scale
economi es.
2. Standardizati on
Standardization of languages, communications
protocols, packaged software, and data description and
structures will be encouraged within the industrial funded
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operations by the need to maintain reasonable prices. The
same standards must be applied to applications which are
commercially developed or processed. Only if an application
is 'portable' can the benefits o-f competition be achieved,
particularly in the case o-f contract renewal. It is
there-fore necessary that all commercially contracted
applications either be benchmarked as Yunable' on
industrial fund assets or be specifically granted a
standardization exclusion by the Information Systems
Steering Committee (ISSC) based on a valid justification.
3. Staff Relationships
The role of C4 Division in ADP management would not
change appreciably. C4 would still provide technical
support, planning, and direction concerning ADP policies,
procedures, and standards. In addition, C4 would oversee
the administration of the ADP industrial funded activity.
C4 should, however, get out of the resource
allocation business as far as users are concerned. Resource
allocation should be the responsibility of the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM), as it is for most other Marine
Corps resources. Funding provided through the POM will
permit users to make their best judgment of the resource mix
needed to accomplish their missions.
There will be difficulties and disputes. The
authority for -final resolution of these disputes and the
overall role of keeping ADP planning consistent with long
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range Marine Corps plans should remain with the ISSC. The
ISSC's range o-f interest would include both C4 planning and
user requirements both inside and external to the industrial
funded activity. This is little change -from its current
role. What change there is, is one o-f emphasis: away from
resolution of allocation disputes and backlog management and
toward policy decision making and enforcement of the
discipline of standardization which makes decentralized
resource allocation decisions effective.
G. HOW TO GET THERE
To be successful, conversion to industrial funding
requires time. A systematic step—by—step approach, where
each stage sets the groundwork for the next, is necessary to
avoid major organizational difficulties. Abrupt change is
too disruptive to established methodology. A slowly
evolving plan must, however, have the commitment of top
command to avoid inert ial tendencies toward maintenance of
the status quo. Thus, the first step toward implementation
is to obtain commitment to the process from senior
commanders. Without a firm commitment to support the
project through to its final goal (both from senior ADP
management and at the functional sponsor level of users at
HQMC) , every step in the process will be a timid 'testing of
the waters' . Because the management of change in an
organization is a complex process, there are bound to be
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difficulties encountered. Decisive response to such
difficulties is required.
The second step is reorganization. Those Marine Corps
ADP assets which serve multiple users should be integrated
under the direction and control o-f a single command. While
this process has already begun on a de -facto basis (e.g.,
consolidation o-f programming in MCCDPA's, headquarters
directed standard AIS's, headquarters "targeted' budgets for
local ADP activities), it needs to be formalized in
preparation for a single integrated chargeback system.
The next step, which can begin in parallel with
reorganization, is to develop an effective statistical
costing system and sufficient historical data on which to
base initial funding allocations to users. The single
command structure will make implementation easier. A
concretely identified 'drop dead' date to begin chargeback
will provide an incentive for accuracy. The "drop dead'
date should allow sufficient time to obtain the necessary
historical data. A minimum of three years is recommended
from the date reorganization becomes effective to the
implementation of industrial funding and full cost
chargeback.
A comprehensive, 'cookbook' approach to the specific
tasks involved in developing and implementing a chargeback
system is found in the Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication (FIPS Pub) 96 dated 6 December 1982.
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FIPS Pub 96 is intended as a guide to those agencies that
are required to implement an ADP charging system under OMB
Circular A— 121. The guideline presents a step—by—step
methodology consisting of the developmental and
implementation decisions that must be made, the
philosophical issues a-f-fecting these decisions, and a
recommended order in which to make the decisions CRef. 893.
The guidelines of FIPS Pub 96 should be -followed, but the
decisions made and chargeback characteristics implemented
should re-Fleet as much as possible the philosophy discussed
in this chapter.
H. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
To -facilitate conversion to industrial -funding, a
reorganization of Marine Corps selected ADP activities into
a single unified command, similar to the current NAVDAC
organization, is required. Costing of resources consumed
should be based on standard costs developed from resource
'pools' and capacity planning data. While overall pricing
must recognize the need to recapture all costs, new
applications may initially be priced at marginal cost and
eventually be adjusted toward average cost. Single source
billing is recommended with the single bill sent to the user
who has control of the system. Competition with other ADP
sources can be an effective way of achieving efficiency in
ADP operations. However, competition must be channeled into
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a standardized framework developed tD coincide with overall
Marine Corps goals and strategies as defined through the
POM, the ISSC, and ADP technical management and support
provided by C4 Division.
If industrial funding is to be successful, it must be
achieved through an evolutionary process. Time is required
to allow the effective implementation of organizational
change and to gather sufficient historical cost data to
support initial user funding allocations. These proposals
call for significant change in ADP management methodology.
Accordingly, top level command support must be acquired or
efforts at implementation cannot be successful.
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IX. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED ADP INDUSTRIAL FUND
A. INTRODUCTION
Three basic areas o-f discussion were introduced in
Chapter I: organizational effectiveness; efficiency and
effectiveness via chargeback; and determination of the
portion of ADP services to be contracted commercially. Each
succeeding chapter related to one or more of these issues.
This chapter provides a discussion of how the proposed
industrial fund solution specifically addresses these
issues.
B. BETTER COMPATIBILITY WITH THE EXISTING MARINE CORPS
FINANCIAL CONTROL STRUCTURE
As is true in most military organizations, the Marine
Corps is a hierarchical, command—structured organization.
The Marine Corps is unique, however, in the responsibility
and initiative it requires of its small unit leaders.
Orders and tactics are provided as a standardized framework
for action. The small unit leader is expected to use his
own judgement within that framework to accomplish the
assigned mission. It is this notion of independence of
action and battlefield initiative, yet always achieved
within the discipline of the Corps, that distinguishes the
Marine Corps from either the undisciplined or the overly
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regimented. It is the assigned mission which is important;
how it is achieved is up to the leader to whom the mission
is assigned.
The particular use o-f resources is also decentralized to
the greatest possible extent. Overall operational funding
(O&MMC) , and there-Fore level of effort, is allocated to
subordinates by each senior commander. These subordinates
then reallocate their funds to their subordinates. In most
cases, this process is followed all the way to the
individual cost center level. While there are some
restrictions on the use of local funding, generally imposed
by regulations originating outside the Marine Corps, the
local commander has fairly wide discretion in the way funds
sire applied for mission accomplishment.
"He who directs, pays!" is also a traditional Marine
Corps norm within both the command and financial management
communities. The basic concept contained within this phrase
is that a commander's budget should not be held hostage to
unplanned changes in the level of training or operations
imposed by situations outside the commander's control.
Current ADP management within the Marine Corps violates
both of the organizational norms described in the two
preceding paragraphs. Operational funding for ADP is
restricted by the publication of ADP targets for each local
ADP operation in the annual Marine Corps Field Budget
Guidance Bulletin. This bypasses the entire funding chain.
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essentially setting a local cost center's budget allocation
directly -from Headquarters. This procedure has the effect
o-f insulating intermediate commanders -from responsibility,
either to monitor efficiency, or to provide relief in a
funding emergency. Similarly, a considerable portion of the
processing involves transactions for Headquarters-designed
and directed systems for which the local base or station
commander has no control. Still, the local commander must
foot the bill. As a result, the relatively effective
budgetary control system used by most of the Marine Corps is
severely hampered in its application toward data processing
operations, with resulting inefficiencies in some units and
funding shortfalls in others.
The dilemma is how to best manage a mixture of
centralized, partially centralized, and local ADP
applications with a decentralized financial control system.
The solution to this dilemma begins with recognition that
ADP is not a mission, in and of itself, any more than a pile
of repair parts is a mission. Rather, it is a resource to
be used by those who have specific missions assigned. In
the Marine Corps, it is this mission holder who decides
which mix of resources is best for accomplishment of
assigned tasks. For ADP, it is this mission holder who is
the ultimate 'user' of ADP services. The actual command
level at which this 'user' resides varies. Some AIS's are
tightly controlled with frequency and reports specified by
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the Headquarters -functional sponsor. The -functional sponsor
is the 'user'. Some AIS's are designed for local use. The
local command is the 'user'. Some AIS's have both
Headquarters prescribed and optional -features. The 'user 7
relationship is mixed. If these resources were made to
compete directly with other resources consumed by the 'user"
at each level on a dollar for dollar basis, the use of ADP
could become a rational choice made directly by the 'user'
receiving benefits. A separate industrial funded ADP
structure offers this benefit, without any change to the
current Marine Corps financial control structure.
Similarly, because pricing for ADP services is explicit,
it is easier for the user to decide where to allocate ADP
effort most effectively. Essentially, three choices are
available: use of in—house resources to buy microcomputers
or minicomputers; use of the industrial funded backbone
network of mainframes and data communications; or use of
commercial vendors. For small applications, the local
microcomputer solution might be best, unless the industrial
fund can offer a lower cost. For larger applications,
especially those with significant databases, the industrial
fund network would be the obvious choice, unless a
commercial vendor can offer better reliability and/or a
better price.
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C. MORE EFFICIENT OPERATION AND BETTER RESPONSIVENESS TO THE
USER
A competitive industrial fund is both efficient and
responsive to the user because it has to be. It is
dependent upon continued user support for its very
existence- It cannot grow without increasing sales. To
increase sales requires a marketing orientation. Thus, the
competitive industrial fund must be innovative both in
technology and service to the user. It must also educate
the user concerning what services it has to offer. Finally,
it must be efficient. Competitive pricing creates expansion
opportunity, but efficient operation is required to cover
costs at the lower "competitive" prices. Efficient
operation is also encouraged by billing primarily on the
basis of output instead of resources consumed. By
increasing output without increasing the consumption of
resources, the industrial fund gains more net revenue and
can afford further expansion through lower prices.
D. MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE ADP RESOURCE
The chargeback provisions of an ADP industrial fund will
lessen the need for the Information Systems Steering
Committee (ISSC) to act as an allocation device between
competing sponsors. Instead, it can concentrate on its
responsibility to "coordinate information system strategy
with Marine Corps goals and objectives." CRef. 9CD Instead
of backlog management, it can go forward with "setting
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strategic direction -For management information policy and
building a commitment to this policy." ERef. 913 It can set
Marine Corps wide standards based on these strategies and
goals and review new systems based on compatibility with
Marine Corps in-formation systems strategy, independent o-f
the -funding question, and with confidence that the
incentives built into -financial control structure will
encourage as efficient an operation as possible.
E. THE A-76 SOLUTION
The requirement to use the lowest cost alternative for
'non-governmental * commercial activities is solved by
encouraging direct competition. This saves overhead by
reducing the scope of any commercial activity study. In
fact, in applying commercial activity criteria to systems
(i.e., applications) instead of facilities, the need for
comprehensive commercial activity studies for facilities may
be eliminated altogether. The industrial fund would expand
or contract to the extent that it meets commercial
competition. The requirement for "comparison of the cost of
contracting and the cost of in-house performance" ERef. 923
would be met in full.
The so—called * governmental 7 ADP systems would have to
remain in—house. While there might be some competition from
end—user computing in the form of microcomputers or small
minicomputers for the smaller systems, larger systems might
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end up paying some premium for their exclusivity. They
would still benefit from the overall need -for e-f-ficient
operation o-f the industrial fund ADP network, but might
require some protection from monopolistic pricing. The ISSC
might find itself in a regulatory role for such systems.
Such systems would guarantee the existence of an internal
backbone system. The organizational incentive for growth
would then provide the stimulus for efficiency under
competition.
F. SUMMARY
The proposed system calls for centralized management of
the central 'backbone' of ADP services, yet allows the more
decentralized financial control structure of the Marine
Corps to remain effective. It provides the efficiency
afforded by economies of scale, along with the effectiveness
of user decision making. Yet, it provides a control
structure and a disciplined approach to that decision
making. Finally, it provides a more efficient approach to
choosing the appropriate level of outside contracting for
ADP services. If successfully implemented, an industrial
funded system will provide financial control, without




Successful implementation o-f industrial -funding is not a
-foregone conclusion. Many of the concerns expressed by
critics o-f industrial -funding are answered by the proposed
approach, but there are issues which can block success.
Adeguate command support is required to prevent an
unsuccessful ADP reorganization. Additionally, at least
some degree of price and service competition is necessary as
a stimulus to organizational efficiency. Finally, there are
other issues of concern which would limit success by
restricting effectiveness and/or efficiency to varying
degrees.
B. REORGANIZATION
Reorganization is the key issue. Without
reorganization, any form of chargeback beyond statistical
costing cannot be considered a practical possibility. It is
reorganization which makes the administrative efficiency of
a single billing system possible. It is reorganization
which provides sufficient definition of user and provider to
allow a buyer—seller relationship to exist. Finally, it is
reorganization that allows accurate costing and pricing of
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an entire AIS without extracting 'allocated costs' -From a
hodgepodge of different funding sources.
Although reorganization has already evolved to some
extent on a de facto basis, it will be difficult even with
full support of senior commanders and staff officers.
Without such support, reorganization can not be successful
and should not be attempted. The specific methodology for
achieving such a reorganization has not been discussed in
this paper. It will require significant additional research
and planning. Yet, reorganization must be accomplished
before reimbursable billing for ADP charges to users is
contemplated. Otherwise, serious operational difficulties,
high overhead costs, and eventual abandonment of any
large-scale billing system can be predicted.
C. COMPETITION
While an industrial fund could be formed without
requiring any competition, its value would not justify such
an action. It is the organizational incentive for growth in
the face of competition which demands efficient operation.
Otherwise, the growth can be achieved without an increase in
service or output since a 'captive' user has no alternative
to the industrial fund price. The incentive is toward
inefficiency instead of away from it. Thus, without
competition, user—command relationships, even if deficient
to some degree, are necessary to exert some control on
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efficiency. An industrial fund or even a separate command
structure with ADP removed from line command would remove
this control. This requirement for competition, however,
presupposes that the industrial fund would have sufficient
activity to exploit any economies of scale. If not, a
certain level of activity would have to be mandated. The
problem then becomes a matter of choosing the level of
tradeoff between mandated activity, which provides scale
economies but also an incentive for organizational
inefficiency, and competition, which has organizational
efficiency incentives but may not provide the level of
activity necessary to achieve economies of scale. Setting
the level of activity and the applications to be mandated
would require delicate balance both operationally and
pol itical ly.
D. TOP-DOWN, BOTTOM-UP, AND STANDARDIZATION ISSUES
Industrial funding, in and of itself, does not require
standardization. An industrial fund, however, encourages
standardization because standardization keeps costs lower
for the large scale projects which Are the best candidates
for industrial fund operation. Because the industrial fund
does not prohibit 'bottom—up' requirements definition, a
top—down structural definition of standardization
requirements must be enforced, particularly for smaller
applications. To define structure without imposing task
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definition upon the user will require a delicate balance.
Heavy top—down control will make the system as unresponsive
as it was in the 1970' s. Too much user definition o-f
structure as well as requirements has caused the current
dilemma o-f too many new systems with different design
requirements imposing their needs on a structure which can
not handle them all. While an industrial -fund might survive
as an entity in either environment, e-f-fective management o-f
the industrial -fund will require that a balance be
maintained.
The industrial -fund will not provide an answer to this
problem. The proposed industrial -fund is actually neutral
on the tradeoff between the effectiveness of the central or
global view and the efficiency of the user's understanding
of individual requirements. Proposed requirements for
resources may be defined at any level from the local users
to HQMC. The only requirement imposed by the industrial
fund is that whoever defines a requirement is billed for it.
Who is allowed to define requirements is left to the policy
makers on the ISSC and to the resource providers in the POM.
Thus, the proposed industrial fund does not provide an
answer to the top—down, bottom—up question, but it does
provide the flexibility to follow either approach, or




To remain efficient, and there-fore competitive, an
industrial fund must be able to respond to changing
requirements. It must be able to expand or contract
capacity as requirements expand or contract- Expansion has
been made easier by the change in procurement rules which
allows reinvestment of depreciation, and the recent actions
removing ceilings on civilian personnel employed by an
industrial fund ERef. 93J. Both changes (particularly the
civilian ceiling removal) are subject to changes in
political climate. In the event restrictions are reimposed,
the growth capability of industrial funded ADP would be
impaired. Commercial contracting would probably have to be
substituted, even if its cost structure was not optimal.
Hence, benefits from industrial funding would be reduced.
Contraction in size by the industrial fund, when
warranted, presents unanswered problems. Reductions in
force for civilian personnel are both time—consuming and
expensive. Equipment base, once established, is difficult
to write off. Thus, depreciation and excess personnel costs
would have to be charged to existing customers and rates
would become excessively high, unless new customers were
found or a subsidy provided. Such a subsidy could be
provided in the form of centrally directed new systems
development or research and development efforts. It is
important, however, that such a subsidy arrangement be
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limited and not become an inexhaustible -fallback -funding
source to cover inefficient operation.
Another partial remedy for down—side flexibility which
has been suggested is equipment leasing instead of
procurement. Leasing allows for quicker response to
increases as well as decreases in processing volume and
easier upgrading to modern equipment. The difficulty with
leasing is its cost. When outright procurement of ADP
equipment is considerably less expensive over its estimated
useful life, it is hard to justify leasing as a general
practice. Although leasing might be applicable for specific
short term applications, there is no single answer to what
is best for all occasions.
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
If reorganization can be accomplished, industrial
funding of non-deployabl e, multiple-user ADP assets is
possible and can provide for effective decision making in
the allocation of ADP resources. If a sufficient activity
base can be maintained in the face of competitive pressure,
operational efficiency can be assured as well. These are
big 'ifs'. There are other smaller uncertainties to account
for as well. Industrial funding is, however, a viable
methodology and should be considered in future planning. It
has much to offer.
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